BackgroundFear of failure is described as a “dispositional tendency to avoid failure in achievement settings.” It may potentially and adversely affect students’ ability to perform well in their educational activities.ObjectivesTo measure FoF among medical students at King Saud University, FoF between men and women, academic levels, grade point average, and other factors among medical students were compared.MethodA cross-sectional observational study was carried out using a stratified random sampling method. A total of 455 medical students completed “the Performance Failure Appraisal Inventory” (...) during the academic year 2019–2020 at King Saud University, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.ResultsThe results showed that the mean of FoF was −0.3117. Moreover, higher levels of fear of devaluing one’s self-estimate were seen in women, and higher levels of fear of important others losing interest were seen in men. A significant relation was seen between different academic levels and fear of shame and embarrassment, fear of upsetting important others, as well as FoF. Higher levels of FoF were seen in those who had a GPA below 3.5 and a GPA greater than 4.9. Also, it was high in students who were not interested in studying medicine. The Cronbach’s α value of 0.93 of all items indicates good internal consistency, and the factor analysis confirms five items of an instrument.ConclusionThe overall level of FoF was low among medical students at King Saud University. However, the domains and levels of FoF differed significantly according to gender, academic level, GPA, and interest in studying medicine. (shrink)

The intertwined nature of social, economic, and environmental problems has led to an increase in cross-sector partnerships to create collaborative value. Intermediary organizations can enable these partnerships, but the context shapes what is needed. There is a need to understand how different contexts shape how intermediaries create value. This study fills this gap by focusing on intermediaries in Johannesburg, South Africa. We find there is significant unrealized collaborative value in the context studied. This is due to the coexistence of a (...) limited state combined with a strong incumbent political party. While the existing scholarship on intermediaries is relevant, two particular capabilities are especially important in such a context. First, intermediaries need to focus on seizing opportunities to generate short-term value in order to build trust among partners. Second, they need to strengthen the capacity of the state through lateral influence. Weak and limited states combined with strong political regimes are common in many nations, especially those in transition. In addition, there are a variety of contemporary global political pressures that emphasize greater state autonomy. These contextual pressures make these findings particularly relevant to partnership scholars and practitioners. (shrink)

One of the most fundamental problems plaguing the state of social science research in the United Arab Emirates is the lack of methodologies that appropriately respond to the cultural context of the country. Most social science research published from the region has merely transplanted Western quantitative methods and has proved ineffective as very few social problems in UAE have been appropriately responded to by social science research. This paper suggests the use of qualitative methods to make social science research in (...) UAE more relevant and impactful. This researcher contends that qualitative methods present an epistemological framework that allows for a greater recognition of the cultural uniqueness of the country and that addresses the nuances that make UAE difficult to study under quantitative methods. (shrink)

Deals with topics and insight into the design and architecture of next-generation computing systems that deal with human and social problems. Processor and Internet technologies form the subject matter and focal point, while information and knowledge on the Internet delivered by next-generation mobile networks form the technical core presented.

When used in conjunction with the current floorplan and the optimization technique in circuit design engineering, this research allows for the evaluation of design parameters that can be used to reduce congestion during integrated circuit fabrication. Testing the multiple alternative consequences of IC design will be extremely beneficial in this situation, as will be demonstrated further below. If the importance of placement and routing congestion concerns is underappreciated, the IC implementation may experience significant nonlinear problems throughout the process as a (...) result of the underappreciation of placement and routing congestion concerns. The use of standard optimization techniques in integrated circuit design is not the most effective strategy when it comes to precisely estimating nonlinear aspects in the design of integrated circuits. To this end, advanced tools such as Xilinx VIVADO and the ICC2 have been developed, in addition to the ICC1 and VIRTUOSO, to explore for computations and recover the actual parameters that are required to design optimal placement and routing for well-organized and ordered physical design. Furthermore, this work employs the perimeter degree technique to measure routing congestion in both horizontal and vertical directions for a silicon chip region and then applies the technique to lower the density of superfluous routing. Recently, a metaheuristic approach to computation has increased in favor, particularly in the last two decades. It is a classic graph theory problem, and it is also a common topic in the field of optimization. However, it does not provide correct information about where and how nodes should be put, despite its popularity. Consequently, in conjunction with the optimized floorplan data, the optimized model created by the Improved Harmonic Search Optimization algorithm undergoes testing and investigation in order to estimate the amount of congestion that occurs during the routing process in VLSI circuit design and to minimize the amount of congestion that occurs. (shrink)

Source: Author: Ahamed Lebbe Mohamed Aslam, S.M. Ahamed Lebbe There is a relationship between the fiscal deficit and inflation, which was confirmed empirically in several studies conducted in many countries. Sri Lanka has been encountering the problem of inflation for the recent years. But in Sri Lanka, this proposition has not yet been studied scientifically. Therefore, this study was going to fill this gap. The objective of this study was to test the impact of fiscal deficit on inflation (...) in Sri Lanka. For this study, the annual time series data were used during the period of 1959 to 2013. The fiscal deficit, exchange rate, government expenditures and import outflow were used as independent variables while the Colombo consumer price index was considered as dependent variable. In addition, the multiple regressions model was used to test the impact of fiscal deficit on inflation. Based on the regression results, the fiscal deficit preserved the positive relationship with inflation in Sri Lanka at one percent significant level. Therefore, this study confirmed that the fiscal deficit accelerates the inflation in Sri Lanka. ]]>. (shrink)

Publication date: 29 September 2016 Source: Author: Ahamed Lebbe Mohamed Aslam Interest rate is one of the primary tools in the monetary policy which moves the countries’ economy into positive or negative path. In the meantime, the fiscal imbalance keeps a bond on the interest rate of countries. Empirically, this study tested the impact of fiscal imbalance on the interest rate in Sri Lanka using the annual time series data from the period of 1959 to 2014. In this study, (...) the fiscal imbalance was considered as the independent variable and the interest rate was used as the independent variable. While the money supply and the inflation rates were utilized as controlled variables. To test this impact, the multiple regressions model was employed. Based on the regression outcome, the fiscal imbalance positively maintained the relationship on the interest rate at one percent level. (shrink)

Source: Author: Ahamed Lebbe Mohamed Aslam Nowadays, policy makers believe that the tourism is a positive tool for economic growth of nations because which helps to economies of countries by several ways. In Sri Lankan experience it was not statistically confirmed. The aim of this study was to test the nexus between the tourism earnings and the gross domestic product in Sri Lanka. To test this nexus this study used time series data during the period of 1970 to 2014, (...) and employed the multiple regressions model. In this study, the gross domestic product in constant price was used as dependant variable and exchange rate, foreign remittance, tourism earning, and inflation rate were considered as independent variables. Based on the regression outcomes, this study found that the tourism positively maintained the nexus on the gross domestic product in Sri Lanka at five percent significant level. ]]>. (shrink)

At the beginning of 2020, COVID-19 became a global problem. Despite all the efforts to emphasize the relevance of preventive measures, not everyone adhered to them. Thus, learning more about the characteristics determining attitudinal and behavioral responses to the pandemic is crucial to improving future interventions. In this study, we applied machine learning on the multi-national data collected by the International Collaboration on the Social and Moral Psychology of COVID-19 (N = 51,404) to test the predictive efficacy of constructs from (...) social, moral, cognitive, and personality psychology, as well as socio-demographic factors, in the attitudinal and behavioral responses to the pandemic. The results point to several valuable insights. Internalized moral identity provided the most consistent predictive contribution—individuals perceiving moral traits as central to their self-concept reported higher adherence to preventive measures. Similar was found for morality as cooperation, symbolized moral identity, self-control, open-mindedness, collective narcissism, while the inverse relationship was evident for the endorsement of conspiracy theories. However, we also found a non-negligible variability in the explained variance and predictive contributions with respect to macro-level factors such as the pandemic stage or cultural region. Overall, the results underscore the importance of morality-related and contextual factors in understanding adherence to public health recommendations during the pandemic. (shrink)

Substance use disorders (SUDs) constitute a growing global health crisis, yet many limitations and challenges exist in SUD treatment research, including the lack of objective brain-based markers for tracking treatment outcomes. Electroencephalography (EEG) is a neurophysiological technique for measuring brain activity, and although much is known about EEG activity in acute and chronic substance use, knowledge regarding EEG in relation to abstinence and treatment outcomes is sparse. We performed a scoping review of longitudinal and pre-post treatment EEG studies that explored (...) putative changes in brain function associated with abstinence and/or treatment in individuals with SUD. Following PRISMA guidelines, we identified studies published between January 2000 and March 2022 from online databases. Search keywords included EEG, addictive substances (e.g., alcohol, cocaine, methamphetamine), and treatment related terms (e.g., abstinence, relapse). Selected studies used EEG at least at one time point as a predictor of abstinence or other treatment-related outcomes; or examined pre- vs. post-SUD intervention (brain stimulation, pharmacological, behavioral) EEG effects. Studies were also rated on the risk of bias and quality using validated instruments. Forty-four studies met the inclusion criteria. More consistent findings included lower oddball P3 and higher resting beta at baseline predicting negative outcomes, and abstinence-mediated longitudinal decrease in cue-elicited P3 amplitude and resting beta power. Other findings included abstinence or treatment-related changes in late positive potential (LPP) and N2 amplitudes, as well as in delta and theta power. Existing studies were heterogeneous and limited in terms of specific substances of interest, brief times for follow-ups, and inconsistent or sparse results. Encouragingly, in this limited but maturing literature, many studies demonstrated partial associations of EEG markers with abstinence, treatment outcomes, or pre-post treatment-effects. Studies were generally of good quality in terms of risk of bias. More EEG studies are warranted to better understand abstinence- or treatment-mediated neural changes or to predict SUD treatment outcomes. Future research can benefit from prospective large-sample cohorts and the use of standardized methods such as task batteries. EEG markers elucidating the temporal dynamics of changes in brain function related to abstinence and/or treatment may enable evidence-based planning for more effective and targeted treatments, potentially pre-empting relapse or minimizing negative lifespan effects of SUD. (shrink)

This paper engages Abhinavagupta’s philosophy of “aham,” “I” or “I-am,” in a global philosophical platform. Abhinavagupta reads aham to ground speech in experiencing and expressing subjectivity. The aham, in this background, has three distinctive topographies: aham as the ego of the empirical subject, aham as the subject of experience that objectifies the ego, and aham as the ego that embodies the totality. Nemec reiterates the fact that the concept of pūrṇāhantā or the vocabulary to support this concept is absent in (...) Somānanda. Besides Abhinava, I am incorporating later Śākta commentarial texts in this analysis. My justification for giving Abhinava main credit is that he formally established this concept and later commentators primarily expand upon his insights. See also Bäumer. While aham in its most exalted sense relates to the absolute I-consciousness that embraces the totality, it immanently encloses all individualities within its embrace, enveloping all to find a singular identity through its transcendental gaze. Aham in this sense is the “I-am” in which all those within the parameters discover their individuality while also finding collectivity. It is the I-sense that determines or delimits the parameters of the body, and in this sense aham also stands for the embodied self-experience. (shrink)

This book analyses the many facets-psychological, epistemological, metaphysical-of the repeated philosophical adventures over centuries to explore and explain the indubitability of I-consciousness. While the major focus is on the Upanisadic and the Buddhist traditions, this volume also examines Western philosophical traditions in a cross-cultural philosophical context.

The article offers a close reading of the famous upanişadic story of Indra, Virocana and Prajāpati from the eighth chapter of the Chāndogya-Upanişad versus Śankara’s bhāşya, with special reference to the notions of suşupti and turīya. That Śankara is not always loyal to the Upanişadic texts is a well-known fact. That the Upanişads are (too) often read through Śan-kara’s Advaitic eyes is also known. The following lines will not merely illustrate the gap between text and commentary but will also reveal (...) an unexpected Upanişadic depiction of ‘dreamless sleep’ and ‘transcendental consciousness’. Suşupti is described here as ‘one step too far’, as a ‘break’ or discontinuity in one’s consciousness; whereas turīya is depicted positively, and surprisingly even in wordly terms. Unlike the third state of consciousness in which there is no ‘world’ nor ‘me’, and which is described through Indra’s character as ‘total destruction’ (vināśa); in turīya, the world ‘comes back’, or rather the ‘renouncer’ returns to the world. Sankara’s position, as far as the story under discussion is concerned, is radically different. For him, the Upanişadic story illustrates the continuity of consciousness in all its states. For him, the identification with merely one of the consciousness-states is an error (adhyāsa) which causes suffering. Consciousness prevails even in suşupti, and turīya has nothing to do with ‘coming back to the world’, since there is nowhere to come back from or to. Turīya, as seen by the Advaitin, consists of all the other states of consciousness together, or as K. C. Bhattacharyya puts it, ‘It is not only a stage among stages; it is the truth of the other stages’. (shrink)

On important Islamic religious concepts and terminologies.

On the life of Nund-Rishi, Nund-Rishi, Muslim saint from Jammu and Kashmir and Kashmiri poet.

On the eminence and dignity of parents; in the light of Koran and Hadith (Islamic traditions), also Muslim ethics.

ahad aham indexicality effects in bound considerations and consideration of boundaries.

A modern scientific awareness of the famous advaitic expression Brahma sat, jagat mithya, jivo brahmaiva na aparah is presented. The one ness of jiva and Brahman are explained from modern science point of view. The terms dristi, adhyasa, vivartanam, aham and idam are understood in modern scientific terms and a scientific analysis is given. -/- Further, the forward (purodhana) and reverse (tirodhana) transformation of maya as jiva, prapancham, jagat and viswam, undergoing vivartanam is understood and explained using concepts from physics (...) and electronics. The application of such an understanding to the field of bionics, the electro-chemical neural communication processes is discussed. The possible use of this insight to build software for modeling human cognition and language learning and communication processes is hinted. -/- . (shrink)

The Sense of I: Conceptualizing Subjectivity: In Indian Philosophy (Sāṃkhya-Yoga) This book discusses the sense of I as it is captured in the Sāṃkhya-Yoga tradition – one of the oldest currents of Indian philosophy, dating back to as early as the 7th c. BCE. The author offers her reinterpretation of the Yogasūtra and Sāṃkhyakārikā complemented with several commentaries, including the writings of Hariharānanda Ᾱraṇya – a charismatic scholar-monk believed to have re-established the Sāṃkhya-Yoga lineage in the early 20th century. The (...) textual analysis of the classical Sanskrit sources and their constructive interpretation is enhanced by some crucial questions and points of dispute commonly picked up in the contemporary philosophy of mind, such as the challenge of ontological and categorical reductionism, the criteria of personal identity, the limits of agency and free will, the ineluctability of self-deception, etc. However, defining the sense of ego (ahaṃkāra) and ‘I-am-ness’ (asmitā) is the main focus of this research. Four chapters composing the study are subsequently devoted to: (1) the methodological assumptions of the present author and the basic historical distinctions relevant to the subject matter, (2) linguistic preconditioning of I-consciousness as well as metaphysical coherency and ambiguity of the concept of subjectivity presented by Sāṃkhya-Yoga philosophers, (3) cognitive and ontological issues concerning the embodied ego being opposed to inactive and contentless consciousness, or the pure self (puruṣa), (4) axiological evaluation of self-discipline and significance of liberation from ego. 1. The method, scope, and problem. In the first chapter, the method of comparative philosophy adopted in this book is introduced by a phenomenological analysis of ‘otherness’ and ‘alienness’ inspired by the considerations of Bernhard Waldenfels and his understanding of xenology. This section is followed by a critical reflection on the incommensurability of the alternative conceptual frameworks, supported by some arguments provided by Ludwik Fleck and Richard E. Nisbett. When explaining the term ‘comparative philosophy’, the author pays special attention to those proponents of the aforementioned current who contributed to the rapprochement of Western and Indian philosophical traditions by tracing both their similarities and divergences. The author makes references to numerous prominent researchers, such as Paul Masson-Oursel, Paul Deussen, Stanisław Schayer, Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, Bimal K. Matilal, Raimundo Panikkar, Daya Krishna, Wilhelm Halbfass, and many others representing a younger generation. The historical introduction presents a concise survey of the evolution of the Sāṃkhya-Yoga textual tradition, and distinguishes five phases of its development: proto-Sāṃkhya (7th c. BCA – 1st c. CE), pre-classical phase (1st – 5th c. CE), classical Sāṃkhya (3rd – 9th c. CE), post-classical phase (till 14th c.), and neo-classical phase (since 1927). Here, the author also evaluates the primary sources, including Sanskrit commentaries, and the secondary sources in the light of their relevance and usefulness to the constructive interpretation of Yogasūtra and Sāṃkhyakārikā. Then, she makes some methodological remarks concerning the specificity of their reading. This section is concluded with highlighting three main strategies usually applied when interpreting Patañjali’s sūtras: (1) anti-philosophical approach – treating the text as a merely mystical report or the yogic vademecum, (2) anti-mystical perspective – which reads the text as a highly speculative divagation of no much use to a practitioner, (3) mystic-and- philosophical approach – emphasizing the fact that the theory of consciousness presented in Yogasūtra is both philosophically coherent and empirically (or mystically) verified. The author argues for the third, heuristic, perspective mentioned above. The last section of the first chapter aims to problematize the I-concept (aham) and the paradoxical situation of the ego searching for self-knowledge. This part starts with the acknowledgement of the deliberation on non-self (anātman) by Śāntideva, a Buddhist philosopher claiming that one’s own ego ought to be identified with the ego of any other. Then, the author unfolds the fundamental assumptions and scope of the constructive interpretation she wants to develop following K.C. Bhattacharyya’s clues. When explaining her reasons, she stresses both the need to reveal the philosophical meaning of the source materials and, at the same time, the need to make them meaningful on the ground of our contemporary philosophical enquiry. Thus, among the main purposes there is a reliable, scrupulous and careful reconstruction of the historical conception of the self as elaborated on in the classical period of Sāṃkhya-Yoga tradition, as well as reinterpretation of the sense of I as it was grasped by the Sāṃkhya-Yoga thinkers in terms of modern comparative and ‘polylogical’ discourse. 2. Naming I. In the second chapter, a variety of linguistic categories capturing different aspects of subjectivity is discussed in detail. A textual examination is preceded by clarification of the semantic distinctions made by Patañjali, such as a verbal convention (saṃketa) which stands for uniting or overlapping a word (śabda), its meaning (artha) and a mental state of comprehension (pratyaya) that ascribes the word to a particular object. Among the key concepts there is also explained a spontaneous mental activity referring to pseudo-objects posited only by words (vikalpa), which is unwittingly involved in every process of conceptualizing, designating, and naming objects. Such mental states can neither be ‘valid’ nor ‘invalid’, and are believed to unavoidably accompany one’s use of language. These presuppositions testify to Patañjali’s severe criticism towards all verbal conventions that not only affect the way we formulate and construct our views, but also determine the very process of perception. A major section of the chapter contains the analysis of the ambiguous sense of subjectivity and its basic aspects distinguished by the author in the result of a contextual and comparative study of the Sanskrit terms used in Yogasūtra and Sāṃkhyakārikā for naming I-consciousness. The six basic aspects of the self comprise: essentializing oneself, perceiving (something), getting conscious (of something), mastering or owning (something), and being capable of self-identifying as well as disidentifying oneself. A majority of the enumerated predicates ascribed to the self refer to different functions and activities of the empirical ego and the embodied mind. Yet, apart from this intentional, active, reactive, sensing, and objectifiable self Sāṃkhya-Yoga philosophers distinguish a sense of subjectivity going beyond all these psycho-physical characteristics: the self that remains unmanifest, non-active, free from experiencing any joy or pain, said to be the principle of consciousness. The plausibility of its existence as the final cause of the world is to be determined by the embodied ego by virtue of abductive reasoning based on the analysis of all material and psycho-physical phenomena preconditioned by three guṇas that compose the domain of nature (prakṛti). In the subsequent section, three Sanskrit notions – ahaṃkāra, asmitā, and puruṣa, most significant for the Sāṃkhya and Yoga understanding of subjectivity, are discussed closely one after another to expose their semantic, epistemic and metaphysical connotations. The chapter is completed by some pivotal remarks bringing out the problem of discrepancy between the metaphysical position implied by Patañjali and Īśvarakṛṣṇa, and the grammatical instruments applied by them to express it. 3. Cognizing I. The third chapter addresses two important issues in the phenomenology of self-perception, namely the question of psycho-physical dualism explained on the grounds of the considered darśanas, and the spiritual quest for the ideal embodiment of consciousness. While emphasizing the unity of human psycho-physical nature the author refers to several contemporary Western thinkers, such as Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Thomas Nagel, John R. Searle, David Chalmers and others, by making some comparative remarks on the idea of the embodied mind. Furthermore, three arguments for the plurality of selves (puruṣa-bahutva) are reconstructed and critically considered. The arguments given by Īśvarakṛṣṇa (SK 18) include the diversity of ways in which one experiences one’s life and death, the spatio-temporal distinctness of particular embodied egos, and the variations of features manifested by individual selves. The second section of this chapter presents a thorough inquiry into a non-theistic devotion and spiritual pragmatism defended by the adherents of Sāṃkhya- Yoga. God (īśvara) is defined here primarily as an object of meditative practice and a special tool convenient for yogic pedagogy. In the concluding part of this section four functions of devotional practice (īśvara-pranidhāna) are recognized and explained; they embrace: (1) prevention from mental scattering and dispersion, (2) therapy allowing to form some positive perceptual habits and the right cognitive approach, (3) enhancement of morally and spiritually required qualities, and (4) reinforcement of the sense of subjective identity being a complementary method of self-development. 4. Liberating oneself from I. The final chapter consists of three sections. The first one introduces the concept of liberation through action (pravṛtti-dharma), commonly opposed in Indian tradition to the path of renunciation (nivṛtti- dharma). According to Hariharānanda Ᾱraṇya’s interpretation, both Sāṃkhya- Yoga and Buddhism follow the latter one, which in terms of spiritual practice dynamics makes them much closer to each other than it is usually believed. In the subsequent section the idea of liberating oneself from one’s attachment to ego is explained in detail, along with the significance of gradual self-negation. Then the author raises the interpretation of the Sāṃkhya-Yoga perspective on liberation as self-distinction-through-renunciation. The main focus in this section is placed on the sense of agency (kartṛ), the problem of free will, and the criteria of moral and soteriological evaluation of one’s deeds. Some crucial questions on karmic conditioning of self-knowledge in the form of kleśas are also the subject of careful analysis. The next section undertakes the issue of ownership (mamakāra) of one’s activity and self-esteem (abhimāna) involved in spiritual growth. Again, some comparative remarks are made by referring to the Buddhist philosophers’ positions, such as Nāgārjuna, Āryadeva and Candrakīrti. Among others, the Buddhist refutation of the Sāṃkhya-Yoga concept of eternal, inactive, indifferent, irresponsible, and exclusively conscious self (puruṣa) is quoted and partly rejected in favour of the classical Hindu darśanas. In summary, the author emphasized the significance-generating or sense-creating function of I, its engagement in the search for its own raison d’être, its role in self-identification as well as subverting it, and the expediency of liberation from ego. The philosophers of classical Sāṃkhya and Yoga indicate a twofold sense of the self; on the one hand, the only appropriate designation: ‘I’ is true self (puruṣa), a passive and unknowable principle of consciousness whose existence makes the empirical phenomena meaningful. On the other hand, the ‘I’ clearly designates the current sense of the self, expressed as “I think”, “I doubt”, “I suffer”, etc. This second meaning of ‘I’, the specific sense of ‘mineness’, is recognized as a secondary and relative one – thus illusive and troublesome. However, its delusiveness does not mean that the empirical ego is an unreal or non-existent entity. What it implies is that the empirical self-identity is fundamentally inadequate and – according to the Indian thinkers – ought to be unveiled and, ultimately, given up. (shrink)

In Islamic thought, the accumulation regarding Tafsir appears in various ways. One of them is the type of work called Anmudhaj that contains chapters about Tafsīr. In the An-mudhaj type of works, the determination of the sciences to investigate may occur according to different criteria. These criteria may occur as a classification of science and they also can be limited to a few sciences. In this article, we will examine the Tafsīr chapter from the work of Sipāhīzādah who took charge (...) as a teacher and judge in the Ottoman Empire. That part cons-titutes the first chapter of the work called Anmūdhaju’l-Funūn which he symbolically limited the investigated sciences to seven. The other investigated sciences in the work are Ḥadīth, Kalām, the methodology of Islamic Law, Fiqh, Bayân, and Medical Science. In the Tafsīr chap-ter of the work of Sipāhīzādah called Anmūdhaju’l-Funūn, seven different issues are investi-gated in total. Those questions are “Does Bismillah count as a vow?” and “What is the order of the creation of the earth and the heavens in the light of the verse al-Baqarah 2/29?” and “Do the names of the numbers imply limitation (hasr)?” and “What is the reason behind the borrowing of Israelites the jewels of the Egyptians in the light of the verse al-Baqarah 2/50?” and “The entry order to the city was given to Israelites in the verses al-Baqara 2/58-59, was this order given to them before or after their deviation?” and “Where is the prostrated door which is mentioned in the verse?” and “How can we assess Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s questions and answers regarding the narrative differences between the verses al-Baqarah (2/58-59) and al-A‘râf (7/161-162)?” Sipāhīzādah examined the issues of Tafsīr through a historical which makes him the participant of the debate and allows him to the continue the present discourse through a critical reading. This makes the subject of work quite important. Because thanks to the work, it will be possible to catch some clues about the progress of the accumu-lation regarding Tafsīr in the era the author lived.Summary: In Islamic thought, the accumulation regarding Tafsīr appears in various ways. One of them is the type of work called Anmudhaj that contains chapters about Tafsīr. In Anmudhaj type of works, the determination of the sciences to investigate may occur according to diffe-rent criteria. These criteria may occur as a classification of science and they also can be limi-ted to a few sciences. In this article, we will examine the Tafsīr chapter from the work of Sipāhīzādah who took charge as a teacher and judge in the Ottoman Empire. That part cons-titutes the first chapter of the work called Anmūdhaju’l-Funūn which he symbolically limited the investigated sciences to seven. The other investigated sciences in the work are Ḥadīth, Kalām, the methodology of Islamic Law, Fiqh, Bayân, and Medical Science.The work of Sipāhīzādah, Anmūdhaju’l-Funūn consists of seven chapters and also seven is-sues are investigated in the Tafsīr part of the work. The first investigated issue in the Tafsīr part is the issue of Basmalah and in our opinion, it would not be surprising to accept that in one dimension it is a conscious choice aimed at the beginning of the work. His general attitude is presenting the issues firstly. He constituted all of the issues through the trio of al-Zamakhs-harī, al-Rāzī, and al-Bayḍāwī either one or two of them. Another remarkable point in the de-velopment of the issues is Sipāhīzādah begins with Basmalah according to the Mushaf com-position and proceeds to al-Baqarah verse 59 in a particular order. According to this, the aut-hor takes the problems he detected in the relevant parts as a subject.The issues that are investigated in the Tafsīr chapter can be listed as follows:1. Can Bismillah be used as a vow? According to Sipāhīzādah, al-Bayḍāwī, al-Jurjānī and Mollā Khusraw claim that there is a difference between vowing in the name of God and starting something with Bismillah and this difference should be rejected through the work of al-Mergīnānī that is called Hidâye and Ibn al-Humām’s Sharh. Thus, according to him one of the differences between Billah and Bismillah is not that they count as a vow.2. What is the order of the creation of the earth and the heavens in the light of the verse al-Baqarah 2/29? Sipāhīzādah mentions that the creation and the arrangement of the earth did not happen at the same time.3. Do the names of the numbers imply limitation (hasr)? Regarding this issue, Sipāhīzādah took the verse that says “…and made them seven heavens” as the focal point and claimed that the mentioned number in this verse indicated limitation and gave examples from verses, hadith, linguists and scholars of the methodology.4. What is the reason behind the borrowing of Israelites the jewels of the Egyptians in the light of the verse al-Baqarah 2/50? Sipāhīzādah criticized the two arguments of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī. Sipāhīzādah criticized the assessments that Ancient Egyptians pursued those properties which they lent before and Israelites kept those jewels and he rejected them.5. The entry order to the city was given to Israelites in the verses al-Baqara 2/58-59, was this order given to them before or after their deviation? He criticized the argu-ments of al-Zamakhsharī and al-Bayḍāwī which they have given to prove that this order was given to them after their deviation. He offered arguments and emphasi-zed that the entry order to the city was given before their deviation.6. Where is the prostrated door which is mentioned in the verse al-Baqara 2/58? It is controversial if it is Jerusalem or the door of the Mosque in which they were perfor-ming the prayer. al-Zamakhsharī and al-Bayḍāwī claim that it is Jerusalem. Was this order given before or after the death of the prophet Moses? Sipāhīzādah thinks that it has to be the door of Jerusalem.7. How can we assess Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s questions and answers regarding the nar-rative differences between the verses al-Baqarah (2/58-59) and al-A‘râf (7/161-162)? Sipāhīzādah criticized the responses which are given by al-Rāzī and gives contrary responses.It is obvious that the author is Hanafi in the matters of Islamic Law. Besides this, we can say that Sipāhīzādah did not examine the issues of Tafsīr through a sense of belonging, he emp-hasized the opinions of people which he found compatible with his beliefs. Hence, He someti-mes comes to an agreement with al-Bayḍāwī who is a Shaffi in the matters of Islamic Law and from time to time he affirms al-Zamakhsharī who is a Mutazilite in the matters of faith. Sipāhīzādah examined the issues of Tafsīr through a historical depth and this both makes him a participant of the debate and allows the continuation of the present discourse through a critical reading. Thus, an attitude of critical consistency is prominent in his works. In our opi-nion, this attitude of critical consistency is an action of consolidation for the maintenance of the power of the relevant text-centered linguistic system. In this regard, we can say that Tafsīr remained its liveliness in the geography in which the author lived. So, the founders of the system which we can list as al-Zamakhsharī, Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, and al-Bayḍāwī and the ones who caused it to continue which we can list as Sayyid Sharif al-Jurjānī, Mollā Khusraw, and Ibn Kamāl Pasha have been read critically by the author. This makes the subject of work quite important. Because thanks to the work, it will be possible to catch some clues about the progress of the accumulation regarding Tafsir in the era the author lived. Even though it was negative in the issues that are investigated by the author, the fact that the Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī is a prominent figure is an indicator of the maintenance of the dominance of Rāzī. It would be more appropriate to link this with his effectiveness rather than the Kalāmī power of his Tafsir. For Rāzī is not taken as the focal point by Sipāhīzādah only in issues of Kalām. Besides that, he renders Rāzī as a participant of the subject in linguistic issues too such as whether if the name of the numbers implies limitation or not and the usage of varied phrases in verses. (shrink)

Kurt Gödel’s Incompleteness theorem is well known in Mathematics/Logic/Philosophy circles. Gödel was able to find a way for any given P (UTM), (read as, “P of UTM” for “Program of Universal Truth Machine”), actually to write down a complicated polynomial that has a solution iff (=if and only if), G is true, where G stands for a Gödel-sentence. So, if G’s truth is a necessary condition for the truth of a given polynomial, then P (UTM) has to answer first that (...) G is true in order to secure the truth of the said polynomial. But, interestingly, P (UTM) could never answer that G was true. This necessarily implies that there is at least one truth a P (UTM), however large it may be, cannot speak out. Daya Krishna and Karl Potter’s controversy regarding the construal of India’s Philosophies dates back to the time of Potter’s publication of “Presuppositions of India’s Philosophies” (1963, Englewood Cliffs Prentice-Hall Inc.) In attacking many of India’s philosophies, Daya Krishna appears to have unwittingly touched a crucial point: how can there be the knowledge of a ‘non-cognitive’ mokṣa? [‘mokṣa’ is the final state of existence of an individual away from Social Contract]—See this author’s Indian Social Contract and its Dissolution (2008) mokṣa does not permit the knowledge of one’s own self in the ordinary way with threefold distinction, i.e., subject–knowledge-object or knower–knowledge–known. But what is important is to demonstrate whether such ‘knowledge’ of non-cognitive mokṣa state can be logically shown, in a language, to be possible to attain, and that there is no contradiction involved in such demonstration, because, no one can possibly express the ‘experience-itself’ in language. Hence, if such ‘knowledge’ can be shown to be logically not impossible in language, then, not only Daya Krishna’s arguments against ‘non-cognitive mokṣa’ get refuted but also it would show the possibility of achieving ‘completeness’ in its truest sense, as opposed to Gödel’s ‘Incompleteness’. In such circumstances, man would himself become a Universal Truth Machine. This is because the final state of mokṣa is construed as the state of complete knowledge in Advaita. This possibility of ‘completeness’ is set in this paper in the backdrop of Śrī Śaṅkarācārya’s Advaitic (Non-dualistic) claim involved in the mahāvākyas (extra-ordinary propositions). (Mahāvākyas that Śaṅkara refers to are basically taken from different Upaniṣads. For example, “Aham Brahmāsmi” is from Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upanisad, and “Tattvamasi” is from Chāndogya Upaniṣad. Śrī Śaṅkarācārya has written extensively. His main works include his Commentary on Brahma-Sūtras, on major Upaniṣads, and on ŚrīmadBhagavadGītā, called Bhāṣyas of them, respectively. Almost all these works are available in English translation published by Advaita Ashrama, 5 Dehi Entally Road, Calcutta, 700014.) On the other hand, the ‘Incompleteness’ of Gödel is due to the intervening G-sentence, which has an adverse self-referential element. Gödel’s incompleteness theorem in its mathematical form with an elaborate introduction by R.W. Braithwaite can be found in Meltzer (Kurt Gödel: on formally undecidable propositions of principia mathematica and related systems. Oliver & Boyd, Edinburgh, 1962). The present author believes first that semantic content cannot be substituted by any amount of arithmoquining, (Arithmoquining or arithmatization means, as Braithwaite says,—“Gödel’s novel metamathematical method is that of attaching numbers to the signs, to the series of signs (formulae) and to the series of series of signs (“proof-schemata”) which occur in his formal system…Gödel invented what might be called co-ordinate metamathematics…”) Meltzer (1962 p. 7). In Antone (2006) it is said “The problem is that he (Gödel) tries to replace an abstract version of the number (which can exist) with the concept of a real number version of that abstract notion. We can state the abstraction of what the number needs to be, [the arithmoquining of a number cannot be a proof-pair and an arithmoquine] but that is a concept that cannot be turned into a specific number, because by definition no such number can exist.”.), especially so where first-hand personal experience is called for. Therefore, what ultimately rules is the semanticity as in a first-hand experience. Similar points are voiced, albeit implicitly, in Antone (Who understands Gödel’s incompleteness theorem, 2006). (“…it is so important to understand that Gödel’s theorem only is true with respect to formal systems—which is the exact opposite of the analogous UTM (Antone (2006) webpage 2. And galatomic says in the same discussion chain that “saying” that it ((is)) only true for formal systems is more significant… We only know the world through “formal” categories of understanding… If the world as it is in itself has no incompleteness problem, which I am sure is true, it does not mean much, because that is not the world of time and space that we experience. So it is more significant that formal systems are incomplete than the inexperiencable ‘World in Itself’ has no such problem.—galatomic”) Antone (2006) webpage 2. Nevertheless galatomic certainly, but unwittingly succeeds in highlighting the possibility of experiencing the ‘completeness’ Second, even if any formal system including the system of Advaita of Śaṅkara is to be subsumed or interpreted under Gödel’s theorem, or Tarski’s semantic unprovability theses, the ultimate appeal would lie to the point of human involvement in realizing completeness since any formal system is ‘Incomplete’ always by its very nature as ‘objectual’, and fails to comprehend the ‘subject’ within its fold. (shrink)

A successful declaration of one’s identity in saying “ahaṃ Brahmāsmi” is a result of knowing one’s own self as indistinguishable from Brahman. The non-difference between oneself and the Brahman is one’s true identity, and it goes without saying, knowledge of one’s true identity constitutes the correct knowing of one’s own self. That the said non-difference is upheld by vedānta, and we need to put this ideal non-difference into practice is the crux of Vivekananda’s practical vedānta. Vivekananda gives certain reasons for (...) the practicability of vedānta. This paper’s part I is an exposition of Vivekananda’s practical vedānta, focussing on those reasons for practical vedānta and orienting each towards an analytical understanding. In part II, a linguistic analysis of Vivekananda’s approach to one’s identity has been carried out after introducing J. Hintikka’s interpretation of Descartes’ “I think, therefore, I am” and G. Misra’s interpretation of sat cit ānanda. The latter’s interpretation displays a positivist’s linguistic analysis of vedānta, whereas the former’s does a speech act theorist’s analysis of Descartes’ cogito principle. The present analysis indicates that practical vedānta can be read in the light of analytic philosophy and Vivekananda’s approach to one’s identity can be understood in terms of speech acts. (shrink)

The elements of cognitive science present in the Isaavaasya Upanishad will be presented and decoded into cognitive science. The technical terms used to represent human consciousness as aham, atman, Brahman, - padaartha - mind and their functions, the origin of the universe as idam, vivartanam, viswam, prapancham, jagat and their cognitive science meanings will be delineated. The seer and the seen will be differentiated and the conscious states or phases of mind - aatma dasa and various maanisika dasas - will (...) be described. The evolution of science of human cognition and communication through Advaita / dvaita philosophy, nyaaya-vaiseshika, saamkhya-yoga and poorva meemaamsa and uttara meemaamsa and visistaadvaita systems of thought will be examined -/- . (shrink)

Since time immemorial Indian culture has been upholding a symbiotic relationship between man and environment. It has led to the all round evolution of Indian culture as an integral whole. This assimilation has been possible due to the spiritual vision of Indian seers. Every Culture is based upon certain values. In India values are usually discussed in the context of the principal ends of human life (chatuspurusartha): dharma (moral value), artha (political and economic values), kama (sensual value) and moksha (spiritual (...) value). Indian cultural tradition shaped human behaviour in accordance with these values, which impinged ecological issues as well. Again, Indian classification of value is based on two percepts. These are (1) the essential infinitude and divinity of all souls and (2) the essential oneness and solidarity of universe and all life. Supreme being resides in all; hence no area of life is alien to spiritual influence. It emphasizes the presence of an infinite knowledge, power, purity and bliss behind the body-mind complex of human beings, which is called Atman. Upanisads express this truth as Aham Brahmasmi (I am Brahman) or Ayam Atma Brahma (the individual soul is Brahman) or Tat Twam Asi (thou art that). Acceptance of the presence of God in everything led Indian culture to maintain and protect the natural harmonious relationship between human beings and nature. Moreover, Indians discovered the essential unity of all existence. The universe is holistic. Here at the deeper level of all pervading consciousness everything in the world is interconnected. Oneness of the entire reality is the basic presupposition and the guiding principle of the spiritualistic approach of Indian culture. The paper is an attempt to show that the holistic view of Indian culture is mirrored in the philosophy of ecology. (shrink)

This twelfth volume of Collected Papers includes 86 papers comprising 976 pages on Neutrosophics Theory and Applications, published between 2013-2021 in the international journal and book series “Neutrosophic Sets and Systems” by the author alone or in collaboration with the following 112 co-authors (alphabetically ordered) from 21 countries: Abdel Nasser H. Zaied, Muhammad Akram, Bobin Albert, S. A. Alblowi, S. Anitha, Guennoun Asmae, Assia Bakali, Ayman M. Manie, Abdul Sami Awan, Azeddine Elhassouny, Erick González-Caballero, D. Dafik, Mithun Datta, Arindam Dey, (...) Mamouni Dhar, Christopher Dyer, Nur Ain Ebas, Mohamed Eisa, Ahmed K. Essa, Faruk Karaaslan, João Alcione Sganderla Figueiredo, Jorge Fernando Goyes García, N. Ramila Gandhi, Sudipta Gayen, Gustavo Alvarez Gómez, Sharon Dinarza Álvarez Gómez, Haitham A. El-Ghareeb, Hamiden Abd El-Wahed Khalifa, Masooma Raza Hashmi, Ibrahim M. Hezam, German Acurio Hidalgo, Le Hoang Son, R. Jahir Hussain, S. Satham Hussain, Ali Hussein Mahmood Al-Obaidi, Hays Hatem Imran, Nabeela Ishfaq, Saeid Jafari, R. Jansi, V. Jeyanthi, M. Jeyaraman, Sripati Jha, Jun Ye, W.B. Vasantha Kandasamy, Abdullah Kargın, J. Kavikumar, Kawther Fawzi Hamza Alhasan, Huda E. Khalid, Neha Andalleb Khalid, Mohsin Khalid, Madad Khan, D. Koley, Valeri Kroumov, Manoranjan Kumar Singh, Pavan Kumar, Prem Kumar Singh, Ranjan Kumar, Malayalan Lathamaheswari, A.N. Mangayarkkarasi, Carlos Rosero Martínez, Marvelio Alfaro Matos, Mai Mohamed, Nivetha Martin, Mohamed Abdel-Basset, Mohamed Talea, K. Mohana, Muhammad Irfan Ahamad, Rana Muhammad Zulqarnain, Muhammad Riaz, Muhammad Saeed, Muhammad Saqlain, Muhammad Shabir, Muhammad Zeeshan, Anjan Mukherjee, Mumtaz Ali, Deivanayagampillai Nagarajan, Iqra Nawaz, Munazza Naz, Roan Thi Ngan, Necati Olgun, Rodolfo González Ortega, P. Pandiammal, I. Pradeepa, R. Princy, Marcos David Oviedo Rodríguez, Jesús Estupiñán Ricardo, A. Rohini, Sabu Sebastian, Abhijit Saha, Mehmet Șahin, Said Broumi, Saima Anis, A.A. Salama, Ganeshsree Selvachandran, Seyed Ahmad Edalatpanah, Sajana Shaik, Soufiane Idbrahim, S. Sowndrarajan, Mohamed Talea, Ruipu Tan, Chalapathi Tekuri, Selçuk Topal, S. P. Tiwari, Vakkas Uluçay, Maikel Leyva Vázquez, Chinnadurai Veerappan, M. Venkatachalam, Luige Vlădăreanu, Ştefan Vlăduţescu, Young Bae Jun, Wadei F. Al-Omeri, Xiao Long Xin.‬‬‬‬‬‬. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Studies in Advaita Vedanta: Towards an Advaita Theory of ConsciousnessChakravarthi Ram-PrasadStudies in Advaita Vedanta: Towards an Advaita Theory of Consciousness. By Sukharanjan Saha. Kolkata: Jadavpur University, 2004. Pp. 231.Studies in Advaita Vedanta: Towards an Advaita Theory of Consciousness, by Sukhar-anjan Saha, is a collection of papers each of which has something to say about consciousness in Advaita, although some of the papers have a rather tenuous connection to (...) this theme. Saha brings to bear a lifetime of study of Advaita and its philosophical contexts in these essays. The one notable lacuna in his approach is the tendency to ignore virtually all contemporary literature on Advaita, and to concentrate almost entirely on the original Sanskrit texts themselves—although he is clearly at home in a variety of modern philosophical techniques. His views are, in themselves, interesting and carefully spelled out.In "The Many Faces of the 'I,' " Saha draws on well-known uses of aham in Śaṅkara, Vācaspati, and Padmapāda to draw the larger conclusion that Advaita is willing to allow for multiple, context-variant senses of 'I,' in contrast to both a Naiyāyika like Gadhādhara and Western thinkers like Husserl."Advaita Analysis of Suffering" is an elegant and surprising essay. Much of it appears to be a fairly general survey of the manner in which different Hindu and Buddhist thinkers identify a positive cognitive error in understanding reality—avidyā—as the cause of suffering. But Saha notes that the classical consensus on suffering is not an empirical statement; there are ordinary success stories, after all. He then ingeniously uses this fact to show that suffering is something structural to existence. Śaṅkara's example of someone who feels "I am fair-complexioned" is a smug indication of the suffering brought to bear on others who are not, in a society that favors fair complexion. Suffering, Saha argues, is socially relative; it relates to value structures more than mere physical discomfort. If all were of the highest or lowest varna, there would be neither pride nor striving, neither bragging nor lamenting. The metaphysical discussion on suffering, it turns out, is really a commentary on Hindu society.Saha heroically—in the light of modern, especially Western scholarship, which sees Śaṅkara as an arch-conservative proponent of brahminical values—tends to see the Advaitin as a social reformer. In the essay above, he sees ś an.kara as teaching precisely the social lesson against discrimination when he talks of suffering. Saha returns to this theme in "Śaṅkara and Varna Distinctions in Hinduism." He puts forward the argument that since Śaṅkara held that all social distinctions were not ultimate (pāramārthika), and since class/varna distinctions are social ones while liberating knowledge is ultimate, varna is irrelevant to liberation. How those traditionally excluded from brahminical philosophy will respond to this generosity is another matter. [End Page 107]In "Inner Sense and Higher Order Consciousness," Saha usefully explains how Nyāya takes an awareness of awareness to be a matter of inner sense, while Advaita denies this. It is sometimes hard to follow him through the essay, as it is not always clear what is being argued. But the contours of the standard Nyāya and Advaita positions on putative higher-order consciousness are laid out competently. The Nyāya position is clear enough, in that the higher-order awareness is an inner perception, with the mind playing the role of an 'inner' organ for the self. So the self becomes conscious of an object through the mind, and that act of consciousness itself becomes an object of the mind; in the latter instance, the mind functions to generate a higher-order consciousness, taking the first mental state as its object. This is relatively clear, but puts a great burden on Nyāya to give a cogent theory of mind, such that the idea of the mind as an inner sense organ becomes persuasive. But this challenge lies beyond the scope of Saha's essay.Gradually, Saha's argument emerges. Advaita takes the mind to be separate from consciousness, which is the untouched ātman. So, there may well be mental... (shrink)

This paper explains some of the uses of the word ‘freedom’ in Western as well as in Indian philosophy. Regarding the psychological concept of freedom or free will, this paper focuses on the distinction between fatalism, determinism, types of compatibilism, and libertarianism. Indian philosophers, by and large, are compatibilists, although some minor systems, such as Śākta Āgama, favor a type of libertarianism. From the Indian perspective the form of life of human beings has also been mentioned in the discussion of (...) free will. Regarding metaphysical freedom, I discuss the views of the Bhagavad Gītā and Swami Vivekananda in Sect. III. K.C. Bhattacharyya, a neo-Advaita Vedāntin, has discussed degrees of freedom of the subject at several levels. According to him, spiritual progress lies in the progressive realization of the freedom of the subject. I compare his view with the classical Advaita concept of freedom. I have also addressed the question of whether freedom from suffering can be realized at social and global levels. In this context I have mentioned some of the interpretations of the great saying ‘I am Brahman,’ and how freedom can be realized at the global level by using the Advaita concept of ‘oneness.’. (shrink)